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We present a new framework for the design of computationally-eﬃcient and incentive-
compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. The mechanisms obtained via this
framework are randomized, and obtain incentive compatibility in the universal sense (in
contrast to the substantially weaker notion of incentive compatibility in expectation). We
demonstrate the usefulness of our techniques by exhibiting two mechanisms for combi-
natorial auctions with general bidder preferences. The ﬁrst mechanism obtains an opti-
mal O (
√
m )-approximation to the optimal social welfare for arbitrary bidder valuations.
The second mechanism obtains an O (log2m)-approximation for a class of bidder valua-
tions that contains the important class of submodular bidders. These approximation ratios
greatly improve over the best (known) deterministic incentive-compatible mechanisms for
these classes.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
The central problem in the ﬁeld of Algorithmic Mechanism Design [1] is reconciling the tension between the com-
putational eﬃciency requirement and the economic requirement that algorithms take into account the strategic behavior
of the different participants. The need for algorithms and computational protocols that are both computationally-eﬃcient
and incentive-compatible naturally arises in internet environments, where, alongside the standard computational considera-
tions, one must also address the fact that the “input” to the protocols is often provided by self-interested, often competing,
economic agents. Algorithmic Mechanism Design is rooted in two distinct areas of research: theory of computation and
mechanism design (a subﬁeld of microeconomic theory, see [2,3]).
The vast majority of works in Algorithmic Mechanism Design aim for the very robust notion of truthful mechanisms.
Informally, this game-theoretic solution concept provides the very strong guarantee that an agents is better off adhering
to the behavior prescribed by the mechanism designer regardless of what the other agents do. As an example, consider the
following scenario: n bidders are competing on a single item. Each bidder i gains a value of vi for winning the item, and
a value of 0 otherwise. Vickrey [4] proposed the following auction: each bidder i bids bi , the bidder with the highest bid
wins and pays the price of the second-highest bid. Deﬁne the proﬁt of a bidder to be his value (vi if he wins the item,
0 otherwise) minus his payment (the bid of the other bidder if he wins the item, 0 otherwise). We leave it as an easy
exercise to the reader to prove that this simple auction is truthful1: a bidder always maximizes his proﬁt by setting bi = vi ,
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requiring that the mechanisms we design are also eﬃcient from a computational point of view.
Unfortunately, the design of truthful mechanisms is often a hard task. This stems from the fact that the the basic
technique of traditional mechanism design – namely VCG mechanisms [4–6] – is applicable only in cases where the exact
optimal outcome can be computed and the goal is to maximize the social welfare (see later for a deﬁnition). While our
goal in this paper is indeed to maximize the social welfare, VCG is not applicable in our case since computing the exact
optimal outcome is computationally infeasible task in the settings that we are interested in. This immediately implies a
clash between traditional mechanism design and the theory of computation. The clash is inherent: normally, when faced
with computational intractability, computer scientists turn to approximations or heuristics. Sadly, the VCG technique cannot
be applied to approximate solutions [7]. Hence, it is necessary to devise new techniques.
In this paper, we tackle this important problem in the context of the paradigmatic problem of Algorithmic Mechanism
Design – combinatorial auctions. In a combinatorial auction, m items are auctioned to n players. Each player i has a valuation
function vi that speciﬁes his value vi(S) for each subset S of items. The objective is to ﬁnd a partition of the m items
between the n bidders that maximizes the social welfare Σi vi(Si), where Si is the set of items allocated to bidder i. For
a thorough overview of combinatorial auctions we refer the reader to [8]. Combinatorial auctions capture the fundamental
issues of Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Finding the exact optimum is computationally hard, even for very restricted cases.
While several approximation algorithms, with varying approximation ratios, are known for the general case, and for various
interesting special cases [9–14], these algorithms fail to provide incentive compatibility.
1.2. A new framework
We present a new framework for designing incentive-compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. Our techniques
greatly differ from the methods of [15,11], and are inspired by the random sampling methods that were used for auctioning
“digital goods” in [16]. The results obtained via our techniques illustrate the usefulness of randomness (and, in particular,
random sampling) in complex multi-dimensional environments (in contrast to the “single-parameter” digital goods setting).
The framework is used to obtain (in this paper, and, in subsequent work [17,18]) the state of the art truthful approximation
algorithms for both social-welfare maximization and revenue maximization in the combinatorial auctions environment. We
note that, in the context of a different mechanism design problem, it was observed in [1] that randomized mechanisms can
sometimes provide better approximation ratios than deterministic ones. We do not know whether it is possible to match
the approximation ratios obtained using our techniques in a deterministic manner.
There are two possible deﬁnitions for incentive compatibility of a randomized mechanism. The ﬁrst and stronger one,
deﬁnes an incentive-compatible randomized mechanism as a probability distribution over incentive-compatible deterministic
mechanisms. Thus, this deﬁnition requires that for any ﬁxed outcome of the random choices made by the mechanism,
players still maximize their utility by reporting their true valuations. This deﬁnition was used in [1,16,19], and will be called
incentive compatibility in the universal sense. The weaker deﬁnition only requires that players maximize their expected utility,
where the expectation is over the random choices of the mechanism (but still for every behavior of the other players). This
deﬁnition was used in [15,11] (see below), and will be called incentive compatibility in expectation.
There are two major implications of the difference between these two notions:
1. Attitude towards risk: randomized mechanisms that are incentive compatible in expectation only motivate risk-neutral
bidders to act truthfully. Risk-averse bidders may beneﬁt from strategic behavior. In contrast, the universal sense of
incentive compatibility applies to any attitude towards risk, as it applies to every possible realization of the random
coins.
2. Knowledge of the random coin ﬂips: randomized mechanisms that are incentive compatible in expectation induce truthful
behavior only as long as players have no information about the outcomes of the random coin ﬂips before they need to
act. Thus, in order to ensure truthful behavior the mechanism must utilize cryptography-grade randomness, and keep
it secret from the players. In contrast, any randomization that is effective algorithmically suﬃces to ensure truthful
behavior in the universal case. (In a similar vein, technically speaking, using a pseudorandom generator will destroy the
formal incentive compatibility properties of randomized mechanisms that are incentive compatible in expectation, due
to the slight – sub-polynomial – change in probabilities of outcomes.)
The randomized mechanisms obtained using our techniques achieve incentive compatibility in the strong, universal,
sense.
When designing randomized approximation algorithms one wishes to obtain a solution that is “not far” from the optimum
with high probability. This is often achieved by showing that the expected value of the solution of the algorithm is high, and
then amplifying the probability of success by running the algorithm many times and choosing the best solution. We stress
that when designing incentive-compatible approximationmechanisms this technique is no longer applicable. This is due to the
fact that, in general, running a mechanism multiple times and choosing the best output does not preserve the truthfulness
of the mechanism. Hence, we must guarantee that the mechanism will output a “good” solution with “high” probability
without ampliﬁcation. Our framework provides a solution to this problem.
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We use our techniques to design two truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions: First, we present
an optimal randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions that is incentive compatible is the universal sense. This is
another step towards the “holy grail” of obtaining a deterministic one.
Theorem. There exists a polynomial-time randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions with general bidders that is incentive
compatible in the universal sense and obtains an O (
√
m ) approximation ratio.2
The algorithm runs in time that is polynomial in the natural parameters of the problem: the number of players n
and the number of items m. Access to the (exponentially long) valuation functions of the players is done using the usual
demand queries [20,9,10] model, in which bidders are presented with a vector of item prices (p1, . . . , pm) and reply with
the set of items S that maximizes their utility under these prices v(S) −∑ j∈S p j . We note that the O (√m ) approximation
ratio obtained by this mechanism is the best possible by polynomial time mechanisms [21,22]. Furthermore, our result
is technically stronger: For any ﬁxed  > 0 we provide a mechanism that obtains
√
m
poly() -approximation with probability
of at least 1 −  . The paper [18], uses our techniques in a more subtle way to design a mechanisms that obtain a good
approximation ratio with high probability whose approximation ratio is independent of  .
A major open problem we leave open is that of ﬁnding deterministic O (
√
m )-approximation eﬃciently-computable
incentive-compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions.
Using the same framework, we are also able to design improved mechanisms for the important special case of submod-
ular valuations, and actually even for a more general class of valuations termed “XOS” in [13] and “fractionally-subadditive”
in [11]3.
Theorem. There exists a polynomial-time randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions with XOS bidders that is incentive com-
patible in the universal sense and obtains an O (log2m) approximation ratio.
We note that the approximation ratio of this mechanism is very far from the constant approximation ratio that is
possible from a pure computation point of view, even if one disregards the truthfulness requirement [10,11]. Using our
techniques, [18] presents a truthful mechanism with an almost logarithmic approximation ratio for the wider class of
subadditive valuations (see [9,11]). Designing truthful mechanisms with constant approximation ratios for this problem
remains an important open problem.
1.4. Related work
In a landmark paper, Lehmann et al. [23] were able to design an incentive-compatible, eﬃciently-computable, approx-
imation mechanism – which achieves an approximation ratio that is as good as computationally possible Θ(
√
m ) [21,22]
– for a special case of combinatorial auctions, namely, “single-minded bidders”. This is the case in which each bidder is
only interested in a single bundle of goods. For this special case, as well as some other single-parameter scenarios a host of
incentive-compatible mechanisms have been designed in past years (e.g., [24,25,16,19]). However, very little is known for
more general cases in which bidders have complex multi-dimensional preferences.
For combinatorial auctions, the best (known) deterministic truthful mechanisms are obtained by completely optimizing
over a restricted range of allocations and then using the VCG technique. These get a barely better than trivial approximation
ratio of O (m/
√
logm ) for the general case [26], and a weak O (
√
m ) for the “complement-free” case [9] – both ratios being
quite far from what is computationally possible. Some evidence showing that obtaining a non-VCG incentive-compatible
mechanism for combinatorial auctions and related problems would be diﬃcult was given in [27]. (We note that, for a
related problem, in which there are many duplicated of each item, there is a non-VCG mechanism [28].) We show that
improved approximation ratios are achievable by randomized truthful mechanisms.
In [15] a rather general technique was developed for converting approximation algorithms into randomized mechanisms
that are incentive compatible in expectation. The technique is based on randomized rounding of the LP relaxation, and relies
on a clever representation of the LP solution as a scaled convex combination of integer solutions. In particular, a randomized
mechanism for general combinatorial auctions that is incentive compatible in expectation and obtains the computationally-
optimal approximation ratio of O (
√
m ) is given. Using our techniques we match this approximation ratio with a mechanism
that is truthful in the universal sense, and provide an improved approximation ratio for the special case where all valuations
are XOS.
2 Somewhat unusually, the equilibrium obtained is in dominant strategies even for the adaptive query model which usually only supports ex-post
equilibria. See [15] for a discussion.
3 For the XOS class, the bidders must also be able to answer, so called, XOS queries [9].
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2.1. Problem deﬁnition and truthfulness
In a combinatorial auction, a set M of items, M = {1, . . . ,m}, is sold to n bidders. Every bidder values bundles of items,
rather than only assigning values to single items. The value that bidder i assigns to bundle S is deﬁned by a valuation
function vi : 2M → R+ . The two standard assumptions are that vi is normalized (vi(∅) = 0) and monotone (for every
S ⊆ T ⊆ M, vi(S) vi(T )). Our goal is to partition the items between the bidders in a way that maximizes the “total social
welfare”. That is, to ﬁnd a partition (S1, . . . , Sn) of M , that maximizes Σi vi(Si).
Even though the size of the “input” is exponential in m (each vi is described by 2m real numbers) we require algorithms
to run in time polynomial in the natural parameters of the problem: m and n. An important issue is how the input is
accessed. In this paper we follow the “black box” approach: we assume that we are given an oracle for each valuation
function. The oracle is limited to some predeﬁned type of queries. A common type of query is the demand query (e.g., [9,
10,20]). A demand query to a valuation vi speciﬁes a vector p = (p1, . . . , pm) of “item prices”. The answer to the query
is a set that would be “demanded” by the queried bidder under these item prices. That is, a subset S that maximizes
vi(S) −∑ j∈S p j .
Let V be the set of all valuations. An n-bidder mechanism for combinatorial auctions is a pair ( f , p) where f : V n →A,
where A is the set of all allocations, and p = (p1, . . . , pn), where pi : V n →R. f might be either randomized or determin-
istic.
Deﬁnition 1. Let ( f , p) be a deterministic mechanism. ( f , p) is truthful if for all i, all vi, v ′i ∈ V and all v−i ∈ V n−1 we have
that vi( f (vi, v−i)i) − pi(vi, v−i) v ′i( f (v ′i, v−i)i) − p(v ′i, v−i).
Deﬁnition 2. ( f , p) is universally truthful if it is a probability distribution over truthful deterministic mechanisms.
Deﬁnition 3. ( f , p) is truthful in expectation if for all i, all vi, v ′i ∈ V and all v−i ∈ V n−1 we have that E[vi( f (vi, v−i)i) −
p(vi, v−i)] E[v ′i( f (v ′i, v−i)i)− pi(v ′i, v−i)], where the expectation is taken over the internal random coins of the algorithm.
Some special cases of combinatorial auctions have recently received a lot of attention. In particular, combinatorial auc-
tions in which all bidders are known to have submodular valuations are the subject of extensive research (e.g., [13,9,29,10]).
A valuation v is submodular if v(S∪ T )+ v(S∩ T ) v(S)+ v(T ) for all S, T ⊆ M . All submodular valuations are known to be
strictly contained in the more general class of valuations termed “XOS” in [13], and “fractionally-subadditive” in [11]. A val-
uation v is said to be XOS if there are additive valuations {a1, . . . ,at}, such that v(S) = maxk{ak(S)} for all S ⊆ M .4 See [10]
for a more thorough explanation. For every XOS valuation v that is constructed from the additive valuations a1, . . . ,ak , and
bundle S , we say that the additive valuation a such that a(S) = maxk{ak(S)} is a maximizing clause for S in vi . We require
XOS bidders to be able to answer XOS queries, where a bundle is given and the answer is a maximizing clause for that
bundle.
Our mechanisms use the fractional relaxation of the problem. The standard LP formulation of combinatorial auctions is
as follows:
Maximize: Σi,S xi,S vi(S).
Subject to:
• for each item j: Σi,S| j∈S xi,S  1,
• for each bidder i: ΣS xi,S  1,
• for each i, S: xi,S  0.
We remark that the LP relaxation can be solved using demand oracles only [30].
3. A framework for designing incentive-compatible mechanisms
The design of a randomized approximation algorithm comprises two basic steps: ﬁrst, we design an algorithm that returns
a solution with an expected value “not far” from the optimum. Second, we ﬁnd a solution with a value “close” to the
expectation with high probability. Usually, the main diﬃculty is in achieving the ﬁrst goal and proving that a solution with
value close to the expectation can be obtained with some (perhaps polynomially low) probability. The probability of success
can then be ampliﬁed by running the algorithm a polynomial number of times and choosing the best solution.
In contrast, the design of a randomized mechanism is more complicated: in general, running a mechanism multiple times
and choosing the best output does not preserve the truthfulness of the mechanism. Hence we must guarantee that the
4 A valuation a is additive if for every S ⊆ M , a(S) = Σ j∈Sa({ j}).
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one of making sure that the algorithm will incentivize the bidders to reveal their true preferences.
Before describing the framework we need a deﬁnition. Fix an instance of combinatorial auctions with n bidders and m
items. Let OPT denote the value of the optimal solution in this instance, and OPT∗ denote the optimal fraction solution.
Bidder i is called t-dominant if vi(M) OPTt . Bidder i is called fractionally t-dominant if vi(M)
OPT∗
t .
Roughly speaking, the framework relies on the examination of two distinct possible cases: either there is a dominant
bidder – so allocating all items to him is a good approximation to the welfare, or there is no such bidder. That is, there is no
“small” group of bidders that contributes “a lot” to the optimal solution. In the ﬁrst case, achieving a good approximation is
easy – allocate all items to that bidder. In the second and more complicated case, we will perform a ﬁxed-price auction and
will have to prove that we get a good approximation. The key observation here is that two randomly chosen groups that
consist (in expectation) of a constant fraction of the bidders have many properties in common (e.g., both hold a constant
fraction of the total welfare.) This is similar to the main principle in random-sampling auctions for “digital goods” [16].
However, our situation is much more complex due to the multi-parameter setting of combinatorial auctions, in contrast to
the single-parameter setting of [16], and the fact that the our problems are NP hard to solve.
The framework allows us, with high probability, to distinguish between the two cases, and provides us with the tools
for ﬁnding the price used in the ﬁxed-price auction. The main diﬃculty in tailoring the framework to a speciﬁc setting is
showing that the ﬁxed-price auction guarantees a good approximation. Indeed, in the two mechanisms we are about to
present in this paper the price used in the ﬁxed-price auction is determined in a completely different manner.
We assume that the number of bidders is large comparing to the number of items, since otherwise, one can easily get a
truthful 1n -approximation by bundling all items together and conducting a second-price auction.
The Framework:
Phase I: Partitioning the Bidders
Assign each bidder to exactly one of the following three sets: SEC-PRICE with probability 1−  , FIXED with probability

2 , and STAT with probability

2 .
Only bidders from SEC-PRICE will be allowed to participate in the second-price auction. Bidders in STAT will never get
any items, so we can safely use this group to gather the necessary statistics (see next phase). The bidders in FIXED will
be the only bidders who participate in the ﬁxed-price auction.
Phase II: Gathering Statistics
There are two goals to this phase: ﬁnd a reservation price r for the second-price auction in the next phase, and a
price p for the ﬁxed-price auction of phase IV. Only bidders from STAT will be used to determine these prices. This is
necessary to guarantee truthfulness, since bidders in STAT never receive any items.
Finding these prices is mechanism speciﬁc, however, the reservation price for the second-price auction is generally
determined by applying an approximation algorithm to bidders from STAT. If no small group of bidders contributes a
large fraction of the optimal solution (the second case), we can prove that with high probability the reservation price
we obtain is a good approximation to the optimal welfare. On the other hand, if there is one bidder with very high
value for the bundle of all items (the ﬁrst case), we will see that this reservation price has no effect on the result of
the second-price auction.
Phase III: A Second-Price Auction
Conduct a second-price auction restricted only to bidders in SEC-PRICE with a reservation price of r for the
bundle M of all items. If there is a “winning bidder”, allocate all the items to that bidder, charge this bidder
maxt∈SEC-PRICE,t =i(vt(M), r), and output this allocation. Otherwise, proceed to the next phase.
Intuitively, one can think of this phase as handling the ﬁrst case, where there is a dominant bidder. This bidder will
be placed in SEC-PRICE with probability 1 −  , and in this case we get a good approximation to the welfare, and the
algorithm terminates.
The purpose of the reservation price is to handle the second case, where there is no dominant bidder. In this case,
allocating all items to one bidder may provide a bad approximation ratio. The reservation price guarantees that if there
is a “winning bidder”, we get a good approximation because the revenue obtained in the second-price auction (which
is at least the reservation price) is obviously a lower bound on the welfare.
Phase IV: A Fixed-Price Auction
Let R = M .
For each bidder i ∈ FIXED, in some arbitrary order:
(a) Let Si be the demand of bidder i given the following prices: p for each item in R , and ∞ for each item in M − R .
(b) Allocate Si to bidder i, and set his price to be p · |Si |.
(c) Let R = R \ Si .
This phase is meant to handle the second case, where there is no dominant bidder. Indeed, it can be shown that in this
case since FIXED is a randomly chosen group that consists of a constant fraction of all bidders, it also holds, with high
probability, a constant fraction of the optimal welfare. In addition, we show that in the second case the bidders in STAT
aid us in choosing a ﬁxed price that leads to a good approximation. The way this price is computed is setting-speciﬁc,
and is not the same in our two mechanisms.
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Proof. Notice that a bidder can be allocated some items only if he is either in SEC-PRICE or in FIXED. Bidders in SEC-PRICE
can receive items only by participating in the second-price auction with the reservation price, and bidders in FIXED only
by participating in the ﬁxed-price auction. The parameters for these auctions (which are well known to be truthful if the
participating bidders do not affect the reservation price or the ﬁxed price) are determined by bidders in STAT. Bidders in
STAT never receive any items, and thus have no incentive to misreport their preferences. Thus we can safely rely on the
information that provide. 
Some technical properties of the framework
We now study some basic features of the framework that make it useful.
Lemma 2. Fix an instance with m items and n bidders, and some mechanism that is designed using the framework. Suppose that there
is a t-dominant bidder and that it holds that r  OPTt . Then, the mechanism provides a t-approximation with probability at least 1−  .
Proof. Let i be some t-dominant bidder. Observe that with probability 1−  , i ∈ SEC-PRICE. We now show that in this case
the mechanism guarantees a t approximation (otherwise we assume that the mechanism fails to guarantee any approxi-
mation ratio). We have that vi(M) r, thus some bidder in SEC-PRICE will win the items. Furthermore, since vi(M) OPTt
allocating all items to i is a t-approximation to the optimal welfare. Thus, the mechanism terminates by allocating the items
to a bidder in SEC-PRICE and we get a t-approximation to the optimal welfare. 
Lemma 3. Let OPTS (OPT∗S ) be the optimal integral (fractional) solution with the participation of bidders in S only. If there is no
(fractionally) t-dominant bidder, then with probability at least 1− 16t :
1. 4 · OPT∗  OPT∗STAT ,
2. 4 · OPT∗  OPT∗FIXED ,
and with probability at least 1− 16t :
1. 4 · OPTOPTSTAT ,
2. 4 · OPTOPTFIXED .
Proof. We start by proving that the probability that the ﬁrst event does not occur is at most 8t . By symmetry, the second
event does not occur with the same probability. The lemma will then follow, by applying the union bound. We prove the
lemma for fractional solutions, but the proof is almost identical for integral ones.
Let A be the random variable that receives the value of OPT∗STAT. For every bidder i we denote by Ai the random
variable that receives the value of bidder i in OPT∗STAT, conditioned on bidder i in STAT. Let {xi,S}1in,S⊆M be the set
of variables in the fractional solution, OPT∗ . Since every bidder is placed in STAT with probability 2 , and STAT ⊆ N , we
have that E[A] = Σi 2 E[Ai]Σi 2ΣS xi,S vi(S) = 2OPT∗ . If the conditions of the lemma hold, we also have that for each i,
Ai <
OPT∗
t . We use this fact to set an upper bound on the probability that A gets a value that is substantially smaller than
its expectation. We make use of the following corollary from Chebyshev’s inequality:
Proposition 4. Let X be the sum of independent random variables, each of which lies in [0, l]. Then, for any α > 0, Pr[|X − E[X]|
α] lE[X]
α2
.
Since for each i, Ai ∈ [0, OPT∗t ], we have that
Pr
[
A <

4
· OPT∗
]
 Pr
[∣∣∣∣A − 2 · OPT∗
∣∣∣∣ 4 · OPT∗
]

OPT∗
t · 2 · OPT∗
( 4OPT
∗)2
 8
t
. 
4. Combinatorial auctions with general valuations
In this section we exhibit an incentive-compatible mechanism for approximating combinatorial auctions with general
valuations. The incentive compatibility of the mechanism is guaranteed by its use of the framework. As in all mechanisms
built using the framework, the main diﬃculty is to analyze the case where there is no dominant bidder.
In this case, our mechanism uses the bidders of STAT to approximate the value of the optimal fractional solution. We
set the item price for the ﬁxed-price auction to be (approximately) the value of the approximation we obtained, divided by
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a value of at most O (
√
m ) times this price (compared to the optimal fractional solution). The revenue we get in this case
sets a lower bound on the welfare we achieve.
Although the mechanism does use the LP relaxation of the problem, LP plays a relatively minor role. This is in contrast
to previous related work [15,11], where the technique itself is LP based.
The Algorithm:
Input: n bidders, each with a general valuation vi that is represented by a demand oracle, a rational number 0<  < 1.
Output: An allocation of the items, which is an O (
√
m
3
)-approximation to the optimal allocation, a payment for each bidder.
The Algorithm:
Phase I: Partitioning the Bidders
1. Assign each bidder to exactly one of the following three sets: SEC-PRICE with probability 1−  , FIXED with probability

2 , and STAT with probability

2 .
Phase II: Gathering Statistics
2. Calculate the value of the optimal fractional solution in the combinatorial auction with all m items, but only with
bidders in STAT. Denote this value by OPT∗STAT.
Phase III: A Second-Price Auction
3. Conduct a second-price auction with a reservation price of
OPT∗STAT√
m
, in which the bundle M of all items is sold to
the bidders in SEC-PRICE. If there is a “winning bidder”, allocate all the items to that bidder, charge this bidder
maxt∈SEC-PRICE,t =i(vt(M), r), and output this allocation. Otherwise, proceed to the next step.
Phase IV: A Fixed-Price Auction
4. Let R = M . Let p = OPT∗STAT8m .
5. For each bidder i ∈ FIXED, in some arbitrary order:
(a) Let Si be the demand of bidder i given the following prices: p for each item in R , and ∞ for each item in M − R .
(b) Allocate Si to bidder i, and set his price to be p · |Si |.
(c) Let R = R \ Si .
Lemma 5. The algorithm is feasible, truthful and runs in polynomial time. It guarantees an approximation ratio of O (
√
m
3
) with
probability at least 1−  .
The algorithm clearly produces a feasible allocation. In addition, the algorithm is incentive compatible, since it was
designed using the framework. It is left to prove that it obtains the desired approximation ratio with probability at least
1−  .
If there is a fractionally
√
m-dominant bidder, then by Lemma 2 we get a
√
m approximation with probability at least
1−  , as needed. Hence, from now on we assume that there is no fractionally √m-dominant bidder. By Lemma 3, we have
that with probability of 1 − o(1) the values of the optimal fractional solutions for FIXED and STAT are “close” to OPT∗ . If
this is the case, we will show that we manage to achieve an O (
√
m
2
) approximation factor. With probability of at most o(1)
this is not the case, and we assume that the algorithm fails to provide any approximation ratio.
Although the second-price auction was designed to handle the case where there is a dominant bidder, it is still possible
that some bidder i in SEC-PRICE will be allocated the bundle M in Step 3. However, notice that bidder i was forced to pay
at least
OPT∗STAT√
m
. Therefore, that bidder’s value for the bundle M is greater than
OPT∗STAT√
m
, which by Lemma 3 is at least OPT
∗
4
√
m
.
Hence, allocating the bundle M to bidder i provides an O (
√
m
 ) approximation to the optimal solution.
If no bidder in SEC-PRICE won the bundle M then the algorithm allocates the items to the bidders in FIXED (Step 5).
As before, we claim that the revenue is a lower bound to the social welfare. The next lemma shows that in this case
the revenue will be Ω(
3OPT∗√
m
). Hence, Step 5 will result in an allocation that is an Ω(
√
m
3
)-approximation to the optimal
allocation.
Lemma 6. Suppose that there is no fractionally
√
m-dominant bidder, and that the following conditions hold:
1. for the item price p it holds that: 
2OPT∗
16m  p  
OPT∗
8m ,
2. OPT∗FIXED  4 · OPT∗ ,
then the revenue of the ﬁxed-price auction (Step 5) is Ω(
3OPT∗√ ).m
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our attention to bundles in OPT∗FIXED that are proﬁtable at price p per item. That is, let T be the set of pairs (i, S) such
that yi,S > 0, and vi(S) − p · |S| > 0. The next claim shows that we do not lose too much by ignoring all other bundles in
OPT∗FIXED.
Claim 7. Σ(i,S)∈T yi,S vi(S) 12 · OPT∗FIXED .
Proof. Deﬁne T to be the “complement” set of T . Formally, T consists of all pairs (i, S) such that yi,S > 0 in OPT∗FIXED,
but vi(S) − p · |S| 0. Observe that OPT∗FIXED = Σ(i,S)∈T yi,S vi(S) + Σ(i,S)∈T yi,S vi(S). It is enough to bound from above the
contribution of T to OPT∗FIXED to prove the claim:
Σ(i,S)∈T yi,S vi(S)Σ(i,S)∈T yi,S p · |S|m · p m ·
 · OPT∗
8m
 OPT
∗
FIXED
2
where the ﬁrst inequality is because of the deﬁnition of T and the second inequality is due to the LP constraints. 
We now calculate the revenue raised in Step 5. Without loss of generality, assume the bidders in FIXED are 1, . . . , 2n.
In the ﬁrst iteration of Step 5, bidder 1 is asked for his most demanded set. The key observation is that if there is some S
such that x1,S > 0 and (1, S) ∈ T then bidder 1’s demand is not empty. Recall that for each item in S1 we gain a revenue
of p.
We now give an upper bound to what we “lose” by assigning S1 to bidder 1 in comparison to OPT∗FIXED. Notice, that by
assigning S1 to bidder 1 we lose both the value of all the fractional bundles assigned to bidder 1 in OPT∗FIXED, and of all the
bundles in OPT∗FIXED that contain an item from S1. The value of all the fractional bundles assigned to bidder 1 in OPT∗FIXED
is at most OPT
∗√
m
:
Σ(1,S)∈T y1,S v1(S)
OPT∗√
m
because v1(M) < OPT
∗√
m
and Σ(1,S) y1,S  1, due to the constraints of the LP formulation.
We now bound the value of all the bundles in OPT∗FIXED that contain some item from S1. Fix some item j ∈ S1. Again,
using the constraints of the LP and vi(M) <
OPT∗√
m
,
Σ(i,S)∈T | j∈S yi,S vi(S)
OPT∗√
m
.
To conclude, for every item we sell to bidder 1 at price p  2 · OPT∗16m , we lose bundles in T that have a total value of at
most 2 · OPT∗√
m
. To continue the analysis, remove from OPT∗FIXED all pairs (i, S) which cannot be assigned now (either i = 1, or
j ∈ Si and j ∈ S). Now observe that for every item we sell to bidder 2 at price p  2 · OPT∗16m , we lose bundles in T that have
a total value of at most 2 · OPT∗√
m
(using the same arguments as before). As before, remove from OPT∗FIXED all pairs (i, S) which
cannot be assigned now (either i = 2, or j ∈ Si and j ∈ S). The analysis continues similarly until we consider all bidders in
FIXED.
The revenue achieved by the algorithm is an O (
√
m
2
)-approximation to the value of OPT∗FIXED. Since OPT∗FIXED  4 · OPT∗
we have that it is an O (
√
m
3
) approximation to OPT∗ , as needed. 
5. Combinatorial auctions with XOS valuations
The mechanism for XOS valuations is also based on the framework. Again, the main challenge is handling the case where
there is no dominant bidder. The treatment of this case is very different than the treatment in the previous algorithm.
Suppose we assign a bundle S to a bidder with an XOS valuation vi . By the deﬁnition of XOS valuations, v(S) = a(S)
where a is some additive valuation (the maximizing clause). For each j ∈ S , we can think of a( j) as the “price” of j. We use
these prices to ﬁnd a price for the ﬁxed-price auction. Towards this end, we deﬁne the following:
Deﬁnition 4. An allocation T = (T1, . . . , Tn) is supported by a price p, if for each bidder i and each possible bundle Si ⊆ Ti , it
holds that vi(Si) |Si | · p. We call Σi |Ti | · p the supported value of T .
We now show that for every allocation it is possible to ﬁnd a “contained” allocation and a price that supports it that
holds a considerable part of the welfare of the original allocation.
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an allocation (S1, . . . , Sn) that is supported by a price p that is a power of 2, such that for each i, Si ⊆ Ti . The supported value of
(S1, . . . , Sn) is Ω(
Σi vi(Ti)
logm ).
Proof. The algorithms works as follows: query each bidder i’s XOS oracle for the maximizing XOS clause for Ti . We refer
to the value of an item in Ti as the item’s value in the maximizing clause of Ti . Let W = Σi vi(Ti) (i.e., the welfare value
of T ). Let P be the set of all powers of 2 between W and W2m . Notice that |P | = O (logm).
Round down each item’s value in the maximizing clauses to the nearest value in P . Let p ∈ P be the (rounded down)
item value that “contributes the most” to the welfare. Notice that we ignore items with value lower than W2m – our “loss”
is not too high since the sum of these items’ values is less than W2 . We can now deﬁne (S1, . . . , Sn) to be the allocation in
which Si ⊆ Ti and the (rounded down) value of every item in Ti is at least p. 
We note that if a valuation is known to be submodular, an XOS oracle for it can be simulated using a demand oracle [9].
Thus, if all bidders are known to be submodular our mechanism can be implemented using demand oracles only.
The Algorithm:
Input: n bidders, v1, . . . , vn , each represented by a demand and a XOS oracle, a rational number 0<  < 12 .
Output: An allocation of the items, which is an O ( log
2m
3
)-approximation to the optimal allocation.
The Algorithm:
Phase I: Partitioning the Bidders
1. Assign each bidder to exactly one of the following three sets: SEC-PRICE with probability 1−  , FIXED with probability

2 , and STAT with probability

2 .
Phase II: Gathering Statistics
2. Find an allocation that is an O (1) approximation to the value of the optimal solution in the combinatorial auction with
bidders in STAT only and all m items (e.g., using the algorithms of [9,10]). Denote this value by OPTSTAT.
3. Using the allocation obtained in the previous step, ﬁnd a price p′ and an allocation T = (T1, . . . , T |STAT|) such that T is
supported by p′ and its supported value is Ω(OPTSTATlogm ).
Phase III: A Second-Price Auction
4. Conduct a second-price auction with a reservation price of 
2
100 · OPTSTATlog2m , in which the bundle M of all items is
sold to bidders in SEC-PRICE. If there is a “winning bidder”, allocate all items to that bidder, charge this bidder
maxt∈SEC-PRICE,t =i(vt(M), r), and output this allocation. Otherwise, proceed to the next step.
Phase IV: A Fixed-Price Auction
5. Let R = M . Let p = p′/2.
6. For each bidder i ∈ FIXED, in some arbitrary order:
(a) Let Si be the demand of bidder i given the following prices: p for each item in R , and ∞ for each item in M − R .
(b) Allocate Si to bidder i, and set his price to be p · |Si |.
(c) Let R = R \ Si .
Lemma 9. The algorithm is feasible, truthful and runs in polynomial time. It guarantees an approximation ratio of O ( log
2m
3
) with
probability at least 1−  .
The algorithm clearly produces a feasible allocation. In addition, the algorithm is incentive compatible, since it was
designed using the framework. It is left to prove that it obtains the desired approximation ratio with probability at least
1−  .
Let R = 2100 OPTlog2m . If there is an R-dominant bidder, then by Lemma 2 we get an R approximation with probability at
least 1 −  , as needed. Hence, from now on we assume that there is no R-dominant bidder. The main effort here is to
analyze the process of ﬁnding the price p used in the ﬁxed-price auction, and show that the ﬁxed-price auction provides a
good approximation to the welfare. In the sequel, we let P denote the set of all powers of 2 where OPT2m logm  p 
OPT
logm for
which there exists an allocation T that is supported by p with a supported value of Ω(4 · OPTlogm ).
Lemma 10. Suppose there is no R-dominant bidder. Then, with probability at least than 1− 22:
1. 4 · OPT OPTSTAT .
2.  · OPT OPTFIXED .4
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supported value of T k is Ω(
2
16 · OPTlogm ).
Proof. By Lemma 3 the probability that at least one of the ﬁrst two events does not occur is o(1). We now bound from
above the probability that the third event occurs and use the union bound to complete the proof.
Consider Pk ∈ P , and let T = (T1, . . . , Tn) be an allocation that is supported by pK with a supported value of Ω(4 · OPTlogm ).
In particular, for each bidder i ∈ FIXED, vi(Ti)  |Ti | · pt . We will prove that with high probability the allocation T k that
allocates Ti to every i ∈ FIXED and nothing to the other bidders has a welfare of Ω(216 · OPTlogm ).
Let Ai be the random variable that gets the value of p · |Ti | with probability 2 , and 0 with probability 1 − 2 . Let
A = Σi Ai . Since every bidder i is placed in FIXED with probability 2 we have that E[A] = Σi E[Ai] = 2Σi p · |Ti | 4 · OPTlogm .
Using Proposition 4, and since for each i, Ai ∈ [0, R], we have that
Pr
[
A <
2OPT
16 logm
]
 Pr
[∣∣∣∣A − 
2OPT
8 logm
∣∣∣∣ 
2OPT
16 logm
]

R · 2OPT8 logm
( 
2OPT
16 logm )
2
 32R · logm
2 · OPT .
Since there are at most logm possible choices of pk , by the union bound the third event does not occur with probability at
most 32R·logm logm
2·OPT . By our choice of R , we get that all events occur simultaneously with probability at least 1− 22. 
We will show that if the events speciﬁed in Lemma 10 hold we achieve an approximation ratio of O ( logm
3
). The events
does not occur with probability of at most 22, and we assume that in this case the algorithm fails to provide any approxi-
mation ratio.
If some bidder i in SEC-PRICE was allocated M in Step 4, then he was forced to pay at least 
2
100
OPTSTAT
log2m
. Therefore, that
bidder’s value for M is greater than 
2
100
OPTSTAT
log2m
, which by Lemma 10 is at least O ( 
3OPT
log2m
). Hence, allocating M to bidder i
provides an O ( log
2m
3
) approximation to the optimal solution.
If no bidder in SEC-PRICE won the bundle M then the algorithm allocates the items to bidders in FIXED (Step 6). The next
two lemmas show that in this case we will get an allocation that is an O ( logm
3
)-approximation to the optimal allocation.
Lemma 11. Let T = (T1, . . . , Tn) be an allocation that is supported by some p. A ﬁxed-price auction with a price of p2 generates an
allocation with welfare Ω(Σi |Ti | · p).
Proof. We ﬁrst note that assigning Ti to each bidder i and charging a price of |Ti | · p, we gain a revenue of Σi |Ti | · p, while
all bidders are proﬁtable. We will use this revenue as a lower bound to the welfare that can be achieved. However, we do
not guarantee that the actual revenue of the ﬁxed-price auction is close to Σi |Ti | · p.
We now upper bound the revenue lost by assigning S1 – the set bidder 1 is assigned in the ﬁxed-price auction – to
bidder 1, comparing to the allocation that assigns Ti to bidder i. We could have assigned T1 to bidder 1 and gain a revenue
of |T1| · p2 . However, the value of T1 is at most twice the value of S1 since bidder 1 could gain a proﬁt of at least |T1| · p2
by choosing T1, and S1 has at least that value being bidder 1’s most demanded set. We note again that the revenue we
achieve in this case (but not the welfare) might be very small comparing to vi(Ti).
The second possible lose occurs if there is an item j ∈ S1 and bidder i′ > 1 with j ∈ Ti′ . T p is supported by p, and thus
we have that vi′ (Ti′ \{ j})  (|Ti′ | − 1) · p. Summing over all such items, we lose a value of at most |S1| · p2  v1(S1). The
inequality holds since S1 is proﬁtable for bidder 1 under a price per item of
p
2 .
To conclude, by assigning T1 to bidder 1 we lose a revenue of O (T1). The analysis continues by removing from T2, . . . , Tn
all items which are in T1, and repeating the same analysis with bidder 2 instead of bidder 1. 
Lemma 12. If the events speciﬁed in Lemma 10 occur then the allocation generated by the ﬁxed-price auction (Step 6) is an O ( logm
3
)-
approximation to the optimal welfare.
Proof. Observe that in Step 3 we have found an allocation that is supported by p and has a total value more than OPTSTATlogm 
OPT
4 logm . Obviously, an allocation restricted to bidders in STAT only is also an allocation for all bidders with the same value.
We can therefore deduce that there exists an allocation T p of the items to bidders in FIXED such that T p = (T1, . . . , Tn) is
supported by p, and worth at least 
2
16 · OPTlogm .
Clearly, all conditions of Lemma 11 hold. Therefore, the algorithm is an O ( logm
2
)-approximation to the value of OPTFIXED.
Since OPTFIXED  4 · OPT we have that it is an O ( logm3 ) approximation to OPT. 
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In this paper we presented universally truthful mechanisms for two settings: combinatorial auctions with general valu-
ations and combinatorial auctions with XOS valuations. For the ﬁrst setting we showed that for any  > 0 there exists an
O (
√
m
poly() ) truthful approximation mechanism that obtains this approximation ratio with of at least probability 1 −  . For
the latter setting we show that for any  > 0 there exists an O ( log
2m
poly() ) truthful approximation mechanism that obtains this
approximation ratio with probability of at least 1−  .
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a new framework for designing truthful mechanisms. Indeed,
the framework was already applied to different settings. We now mention two of them.
Balcan et al. [17] consider the problem of revenue maximization in combinatorial auctions. A careful look on the mech-
anisms presented in this paper reveals that the revenue arguments are used in the analysis of the approximation ratio. In
other words and very roughly speaking, we provide a lower bound to the social welfare we achieve during the ﬁxed-price
auction by analyzing the revenue obtained in the ﬁxed-price auction. Thus, there is a connection between maximizing rev-
enue and maximizing social welfare. Balcan et al. [17] make this intuition formal, analyze it, and apply it to the settings
considered in this paper, and some other ones.
The paper by Dobzinski [18] extends the current paper in two aspects: ﬁrst, it presents an extension of the framework
that provides a better tradeoff between the approximation ratio and the success probability. Second, it uses the framework
to provide a truthful algorithm for combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders (a superset of combinatorial auctions
with XOS valuations). The approximation ratio of this new algorithm is O (logm log logm).
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